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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although with the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office a supranational prosecuting authority will be created, this will not 
entirely amount to the supranationalisation of criminal justice systems. 
Through the provisions of the Directive on the fight against fraud to the Union’s 
financial interests by means of criminal law, which need to be implemented by 
Member States and transposed into national substantive criminal law provi-
sions, national substantive criminal laws in the area of criminal offences 
against the financial interests of the Union will be harmonised. But these har-
monised provisions will still be the provisions of the national legal order of the 
Member States.1 The same is even truer for criminal procedural law where the 
Regulation only foresees the obligation of Member States to have certain 
investigative measures – those that the European Public Prosecutor must be 
able to request or order – regulated in their national criminal procedural orders. 
However, the Regulation does not set any common standards for national 
criminal procedural rules, which means that Member States are free in this 
regard. Thus, even though the creation of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office represents the establishment of a supranational prosecuting authority, it 
does not amount to the creation of a unified supranational legal order. Both 
substantive and procedural criminal law remains regulated by the provisions 
of the national criminal law of the Member States. This can be seen especially 
in the area of criminal procedural law, where no common standards for inves-
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tigative measures are created. Full supranationalisation of the criminal justice 
system2 would also require the establishment of a European Criminal Court 
competent to try cases under the competence of the European Public Prosecu-
tor. The Regulation does not provide for the creation of such a court. However, 
this is not due to the unwillingness of the drafters of the Regulation to have a 
European Criminal Court established, but due to the absence of the legal basis 
for such an institution in primary EU law.3 
In a fully supranationalised model, there would be no need to talk about 
cross-border evidence gathering because the whole system would be charac-
terised by supranational judicial and law enforcement authorities, and by uni-
fied supranational substantive and procedural criminal law. In the model of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, only a small part of the criminal justice 
system is supranationalised – a supranational prosecuting authority is estab-
lished. However, substantive and procedural criminal laws remain to a high 
extent national, and so do other criminal justice actors. Because the European 
Public Prosecutor needs to make use of different criminal procedural orders of 
different Member States in order to investigate a case which includes a 
cross-border dimension, talking about the cross-border evidence gathering 
still makes sense. 
The provisions of the Regulation contain a couple of references to cross-bor-
der situations and to the questions related to evidence in criminal matters. The 
most important characteristics of these rules are the following: (1) European 
territoriality in ordering investigative measures; (2) limitations arising out of 
national criminal procedural laws; and (3) mutual admissibility of evidence. 
2. EUROPEAN TERRITORIALITY IN ORDERING 
INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES
The European Public Prosecutor can order or request the undertaking of 
investigative measures on the whole territory of the European Union. The 
investigative measures which the European Public Prosecutor may order or 
request can be divided into two groups: investigative measures which must be 
available under the law of Member States; and investigative measures which 
2 For the supranational model of EU criminal law and the various possible degrees in 
its development, see Ulrich Sieber (2009) “Die Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts, Ein 
neuer Ansatz zu den Zielen und Modellen des europäischen Strafrechtssystems” 121(1) ZStW, 
22-23, 44ff. 
3 Article 86 TFEU requires that adjudication of cases prosecuted by the EPPO remains on 
national level. See Katalin Ligeti and Michele Simonato (2013) 4(1-2) “The European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office: Towards a Truly European Prosecution Service, p 14. 
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do not have to be available under the law of the Member States. A list of inves-
tigative measures which must be available under the law of the Member States 
is given in Article 30(1) of the Regulation.
3. LIMITATIONS ARISING OUT OF NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURAL LAWS
Although the European Public Prosecutor can order or request investigative 
measures on the whole territory of the EU, this does not mean that the condi-
tions for undertaking investigative measures are not made dependent upon the 
conditions foreseen in the national criminal procedural laws of Member States. 
In relation to the investigative measures which must be available under the 
national law of Member States, the Regulation prescribes that these measures 
are subject to the conditions set out in the national law of the Member State in 
whose territory the measure is undertaken.4 In relation to investigative meas-
ures that do not have to be available under the law of the Member States, the 
Regulation prescribes that they may only be ordered or requested by the Euro-
pean Public Prosecutor if available under the law of the Member State where 
the measure is to be carried out.5
Although the EPPO can order or request that the investigative measures be 
undertaken on the whole territory of the EU, the possibility to have the inves-
tigative measures executed depends largely on the conditions prescribed by the 
national laws of Member States. Although the EPPO acts on the whole terri-
tory of the EU, the European Public Prosecutor’s activity is legally deeply 
rooted in the national legal systems of Member States.6
The Regulation, therefore, did not accept the approach which was devel-
oped in the research project which was conducted by the University of Luxem-
bourg, under the leadership of Ligeti.7 The project resulted in a system of pro-
cedural rules which define the status and the powers of the EPPO and its rela-
tion with the national criminal justice system. They are divided into three 
parts: the general part; the investigation phase; and the prosecution phase and 
the bringing to judgment. The starting premise of the project is that the EPPO, 
4 Article 30(2) of the Regulation. 
5 Article 30(4) of the Regulation. 
6 Meijers Committee (n 1) p 5. 
7 The results of the research project named “Model Rules for the Procedure of the EPPO” 
are available at: https://orbilu.uni.lu/handle/10993/42085. About the work of the research 
group, see Zlata Đurđević, Elizabeta Ivičević Karas and Zoran Burić, “Konferencija Projekt 
za Ured europskog javnog tužitelja (Nacrt europskih oglednih pravila o kaznenom postupku) 
(2012) 19(1) Croatian Annual of Criminal Sciences and Practice, pp 363-369. 
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if it is to become a genuinely European prosecuting authority established in 
accordance with the objectives of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
needs to be equipped with a “set of powers uniformly formulated and valid in 
all Member States participating”.8 The elaboration and acceptance of such 
rules would enable the EPPO to undertake European investigations free of the 
difficulties which arise from the differences in the national legal orders of 
Member States.9 The fact that the Regulation did not follow this approach, but 
accepted a much more modest one, where the investigative and prosecutorial 
activities of the EPPO are not based on a uniform supranational set of rules, 
but are rooted in the specificities of the national legal orders of Member States, 
shows that the need to safeguard Member State national sovereignty and cul-
tural identity in the area of criminal procedural law was an interest which was 
well taken care of in the negotiation process.
4. MUTUAL ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
As explained above, although the EPPO is competent to conduct investiga-
tions on the whole territory of the EU, depending on the case, it might need to 
rely on the criminal procedural rules of different Member States. If the case in 
the hands of the EPPO includes a cross-border dimension and if investigative 
measures need to be undertaken on the territory of different Member States, 
the admissibility of the measures, as well as the form of their execution, is 
determined by the law of the Member State on the territory of which the inves-
tigative measure is undertaken. This might mean that the evidence collected 
during the investigation, which the EPPO plans to use in order to submit the 
indictment, might originate from different criminal procedural orders. 
When a case is transferred from the investigation to the indictment and trial 
phase, the competence of the court which is to try the case must be deter-
mined. It is highly possible that the evidence to be presented before this court 
would not have been gathered in accordance with the criminal procedural 
rules of the Member State where the court is situated. This might raise the 
question of the admissibility of evidence. The Regulation resolves this issue by 
prescribing a very soft rule on the mutual admissibility of evidence. The 
admission of evidence collected by the EPPO, which might originate from the 
criminal procedural orders of different Member States, will not be refused on 
the mere ground that the evidence was gathered in another Member State or in 
accordance with the law of another Member State.10 
8 Ligeti and Simonato (n 3) p 7. 
9 Ibid, pp 18-20. 
10 Article 37(1) of the Regulation. See Zlata Đurđević, “Judicial Control in Pre-trial Crim-
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5. CONCLUSION
In order to solve problems arising from the inadequate level of criminal law 
protection by Member States of legal interests which are of utmost importance 
to the EU, a model of European criminal justice is created where elements of 
law enforcement are shifted from the national to the supranational level. The 
model of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office proposes the creation of a 
supranational procedural authority which will have exclusive competence for 
offences against the Union’s financial interests on the entire territory of the 
EU. The competence of the EPPO is not dependent on the national or transna-
tional character of the underlying offence. 
In order to enable the EPPO to undertake investigative acts in all the Mem-
ber States of the EU, the concept is based on the idea of European territoriality. 
This means that the EPPO can act on the entire territory of the EU. National 
borders which impede national prosecution authorities from undertaking 
activities on the territory of other Member States are shifted when it comes to 
the activities of the EPPO. This means that the cross-border evidence gather-
ing in the traditional sense, as an activity involving judicial authorities among 
different States, is not applicable here. However, with the EPPO model, supra-
nationalisation is put into effect only at the organisational level, and only in 
relation to prosecutorial activities. Other law enforcement activities and the 
indictment and trial phase of the criminal procedure remain national. In addi-
tion, criminal laws remain national, especially criminal procedural laws. 
Although the EPPO can undertake its investigative activities in all Member 
States, when undertaking them it is not governed by a supranational criminal 
procedural order, but by the national law of the Member States. Since the 
EPPO can undertake its activities on the whole territory of the EU, the crimi-
nal procedural laws of all Member States, as a framework for its activities, 
come into account. 
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